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Regret is an unpleasant feeling that may arise following decisions that ended poorly, and
may affect the decision-maker’s well-being and future decision making. Some studies
show that a decision to act leads to greater regret than a decision not to act when
both resulted in failure, because the latter is usually the norm. In some cases, when the
norm is to act, this pattern is reversed. We suggest that the decision maker’s regulatory
focus, affects regret after action or inaction. Specifically, promotion-focused individuals,
who tend to be more proactive, view action as more normal than prevention-focused
individuals, and therefore experience regulatory fit when an action decision is made.
Hence, we hypothesized that promotion-focused individuals will feel less regret than
prevention-focused individuals when a decision to act ended poorly. In addition, we
hypothesized that a trigger for change implied in the situation, decreases the level of
regret following action. We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 330 participants
enrolled in an online survey. The participants received six decision scenarios, in which
they were asked to evaluate the level of regret following action and inaction. Individual
regulatory focus was measured by two different scales. Promotion-focused individuals
attributed less regret than prevention-focused individuals to action decisions. Regret
following inaction was not affected by regulatory focus. In addition, a trigger for change
decreases regret following action. Orthodox people tend to attribute more regret than
non-orthodox to a person who made an action decision. The results contribute to the
literature by showing that not only the situation but also the decision maker’s orientation
affects the regret after action vs. inaction.
Keywords: regulatory focus, regulatory fit, promotion focus, prevention focus, regret, action, inaction
INTRODUCTION
Every decision that we make in our life carries the risk that we might regret it. But what type
of decisions will be regretted more: decisions of doing something or decisions of not doing
anything? In the current paper we suggest that individual differences in regulatory focus would
affect individuals’ tendency to regret more what they did or what they did not do.
Regret is an unpleasant feeling that is aroused after retrospection that involves awareness to the
negative aspects of a decision. The regret process involves running a mental re-creation of what
actually happened vs. what could have happened, comparing these two options and deciding that
the decision process and the outcome were suboptimal (Zeelenberg et al., 2002; Roese et al., 2009;
Das and Joffe, 2012). The level of regret depends on an individual’s perception of the mental gap
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between what happened as opposed to what could have
happened. The greater the gap, the stronger the regret (Das and
Kerr, 2010). Regret could lead to regret aversion, which further
encourages people to learn from past decisions in order to avoid
similar experiences in the future (Zeelenberg and Beattie, 1997;
Zeelenberg et al., 2002; Roese et al., 2009; Das and Kerr, 2010;
Das and Joffe, 2012).
There are contradictory findings regarding what induces
more regret: action or inaction. Action is considered as doing
something that changes the current situation, such as deciding
to go out for dinner or changing a strategy when trying to solve
a problem. Inaction, on the other hand, is considered as doing
nothing or keeping the status quo, such as staying home or
keeping the same strategy already used. Early research found
that because inaction is usually the norm, action, which violates
the norm, leads to greater regret (Kahneman and Tversky,
1982; Kahneman and Miller, 1986). This finding has been later
replicated in numerous studies (e.g., Landman, 1987; Gleicher
et al., 1990; Baron and Ritov, 1994; Gilovich and Medvec, 1995;
Miller and Taylor, 1995; Ritov and Baron, 1995; N’gbala and
Branscombe, 1997; Van der Pligt et al., 1998; Ordóñez and
Connolly, 2000). This effect has been termed the action effect,
namely, an action that leads to a failure will cause greater regret
than inaction that leads to similar failure (Zeelenberg et al., 2002).
Yet, other studies demonstrated that under certain conditions
inaction can produce more regret than action (Gilovich and
Medvec, 1995; Zeelenberg et al., 2002). For example, Gilovich
and Medvec (1995) indicated that regret perception depends
on the time horizon. Specifically, action is more regrettable in
the short term, while inaction is more regrettable in the long
term. Following this view, Zeelenberg et al. (2002) broadened
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) theory and have added the
inaction effect, which becomes relevant when action is perceived
as desirable and needed, whereas inaction is perceived as less
desired. Zeelenberg et al. suggested that what is considered
normal can be influenced by a relevant past decision. In
particular, when prior outcomes are positive or absent, inaction
is considered more normal and people will attribute more regret
to action than to inaction. However, when prior outcomes are
negative, action becomes the more normal decision and more
regret will be attributed to inaction.
Bar-Eli et al. (2007) showed that sometimes action can be
the norm even without prior outcomes. They found that soccer
goalkeepers in penalty kicks perceive action (jumping to one
of the sides) as more normal than inaction (staying at the
center of the goal) and consequently failed inaction produces
more regret than failed action. Consequently, goalkeepers almost
always choose action even though this actually reduces their
chances to stop the ball. Azar (2013) examined the impact of
previous outcomes not on regret but on decisions in a business
strategy context. He found that whether a strategy was previously
successful or not did not affect the likelihood that it will be
continued or changed, in scenarios where the previous outcome
was not informative about the future, but could trigger emotional
reaction, such as regret.
Other factors that affect the relationship between failure
associated with action vs. inaction and level of regret are
desirability and consistency (Seta et al., 2001). Seta et al. suggested
that errors associated with action or inaction are less desirable
and produce more regret when they are inconsistent with the
decision maker’s orientation (action or inaction) than when they
are consistent. The effect of consistency and desirability was
further demonstrated by McElroy and Dowd (2007). Building
upon Seta et al. (2001) andMcElroy and Dowd (2007) we suggest
in the current paper that the level of regret following action
or inaction is determined by the individual’s regulatory focus,
through the mechanism of regulatory fit. We rely on a well-
established comprehensive motivational theory of regulatory
focus (Higgins, 1997, 1998) to explain mixed evidences regarding
regret following decisions of action vs. inaction.
Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998), proposes that
humanmotivation consists of two regulatory foci: promotion and
prevention focus. People with promotion focus are motivated
to achieve accomplishments, aspirations, and ideals, they are
sensitive to gain - non-gain situations and to the presence
or absence of positive outcomes. In contrast, individuals with
prevention focus are motivated to attain security, responsibility,
and duties. They are sensitive to loss - non-loss situations
and to the presence or absence of negative outcomes (Higgins
and Tykocinski, 1992; Friedman and Förster, 2001; Cesario
et al., 2004; Förster et al., 2004). Regulatory focus can emerge
as a chronic characteristic (personal disposition) as well as a
situational (context-induced) variable (Higgins, 1997, 1998).
The two motivational foci are related to different types of
strategies that are used to achieve individuals’ goals. As was
shown in numerous studies (Crowe and Higgins, 1997; Higgins,
1997; Shah et al., 1998; Liberman et al., 1999; Freitas and Higgins,
2002; Chernev, 2004; Avnet and Higgins, 2006), promotion focus
individuals use approach and eagerness means to pursue their
goals, tend to make changes and to take risks, try to achieve gains,
and are prone to action; whereas prevention focus individuals
use avoidance and vigilance means to pursue their goals, tend to
maintain stability and to keep the status quo, try to avoid losses,
and tend to caution and inaction. The inaction preference can
be so profound that prevention-focused individuals might choose
the status quo even if it is not the profitable one (Chernev, 2004).
According to regulatory focus theory, when the individuals’
regulatory focus matches their goal pursuit means, they
experience regulatory fit, which subsequently enhances their
belief in what they are doing and the significance of their
decisions (Higgins, 2000, 2005, 2006). Promotion focus fits
goal pursuit means, such as eagerness and approach strategies
(e.g., taking risks), whereas prevention focus fits goal pursuit
means, such as vigilance and avoidance strategies (e.g., avoid
risks). Under regulatory fit, people will judge a decision they
made as more “right,” value it more, and feel more engaged to
their decision, than under non-fit condition (Camacho et al.,
2003; Higgins, 2005). For example, Camacho et al. (2003) asked
subjects to imagine themselves having a conflict with another
person and to evaluate the other person’s strategy of resolving the
conflict. Promotion-focused subjects evaluated eager strategies
(e.g., encouraging you to succeed) as more right than prevention-
focused subjects, whereas prevention-focused subjects evaluated
vigilant strategies (e.g., removing anything that might cause
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trouble) as more right than promotion-focused subjects. Based
on the regulatory fit principle, it can be argued that in situations
of regulatory fit, because people feel more right about what they
are doing, there will be less regret.
Although regret is a central emotion, the influence of
regulatory fit on regret is still in the first stages of investigation.
Kwak and Park (2008) showed that fear from anticipated regret
increases the “sunk cost” effect (continue investing in a hopeless
situation) under regulatory fit condition. However, our research
focuses on the influence of regulatory fit on experienced regret
in post-choice evaluation. Although conceptual models have
suggested including regulatory fit as an integral part of the regret
process, little has been conducted in this research area (Roese
et al., 2007; Das and Kerr, 2010). We have found only one study
that examined the effect of regulatory focus on regret (Church
and Iyer, 2012), however, this study was not designed to test the
different level of regret following action vs. inaction. The authors
found (in contrast to their prediction) that people with higher
promotion focus tended to regret their actions more than people
higher on prevention focus. However, this was not compared to
the level of regret following inaction. Thus, we cannot infer from
these findings about our research questions.
In the present study we hypothesize that regulatory fit leads
to less regret than regulatory non-fit. Specifically, a decision of
action will fit individuals in promotion focus, and a decision
of inaction will fit individuals in prevention focus. In other
words, we argue that inaction will be considered as more
normal behavior under prevention focus than under promotion
focus, whereas action decisions will be viewed as more normal
under promotion focus. Consequently, in line with norm
theory (Kahneman and Miller, 1986), we hypothesize that the
phenomenon of attaching more regret to action that fails than
to inaction that fails, will be lower under promotion focus and
higher under prevention focus. Thus, our hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 1:When two decisions resulted in failure, one is an
action decision and another is an inaction decision, individuals
in promotion focus will be more likely to attribute the lower
regret to the action decision than individuals in prevention
focus.
Hypothesis 2: Individuals in promotion focus will attribute less
regret than individuals in prevention focus to an action decision
that resulted in failure.
Hypothesis 3: Individuals in promotion focus will attribute
more regret than individuals in prevention focus to an inaction
decision that resulted in failure.
Hypothesis 1 relates to a binary question of regret (i.e., “Who
feels more regret, the person who chose action or the person who
chose inaction?”). Due to the binary nature of the question, this
hypothesis is essentially identical to the symmetric hypothesis
(“When two decisions resulted in failure, one is an action
decision and another is an inaction decision, individuals in
prevention focus will be more likely to attribute the lower
regret to the inaction decision than individuals in promotion
focus”) and therefore the results, which are presented according
to Hypothesis 1, can also be interpreted as addressing this
symmetric hypothesis.
Hypotheses 2 and 3 relate to two continuous variables of regret
(i.e., level of regret following action and level of regret following
inaction). Additionally, since regulatory focus is an individual
tendency but could also be temporarily induced, all hypotheses
will be tested by both individual and induced regulatory focus.
Along the lines of Zeelenberg et al. (2002), we hypothesize
that a negative prior outcome makes action (a change in the
status quo) more normal than absent such a negative prior
outcome. In other words, a negative prior outcome creates a
trigger for a change, and such a trigger increases the normality of
choosing action and reduces the normality of choosing inaction,
leading to reduced regret from failed action and increased regret
from failed inaction. Moreover, we believe that not only a prior
negative outcome but also a change in the environment may
create a trigger for change, increasing the normality of action
and reducing the normality of inaction, and therefore reducing
the regret from action decisions compared to inaction decisions.
For example, a trigger for change could stem from changing
the targeted production level in one’s work environment, which
implies that a change in one’s work strategy might be needed. To
sum, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4: A trigger for change (caused by prior negative
outcome or by a change in the environment) will reduce regret
after failed action and increase regret after failed inaction.
Several demographic variables might affect the tendency to regret
action or inaction. People’s level of religiosity may affect their
tendency to favor action vs. inaction in different life situations.
For example the Orthodox in Israel are known for their aversion
of changes and by their clinging to the status quo, holding
the motto of “to any proposal for change say ‘no”’ (Lehmann
and Siebzehner, 2009). Therefore, they might show more regret
following action. Other demographic variables, such as gender,
age, and income level could also affect the level of regret and
therefore were taken into account in our analysis.
METHODS
To test our hypotheses, we conducted an online experiment that
included six scenarios in which regulatory focus (prevention
vs. promotion) was induced, and regret level was measured
after scenarios of failed action decisions vs. failed inaction
decisions. In addition, chronic individual regulatory focus as
well as demographic and personal variables were measured. The
study received an approval from the Human Subjects Research
Committee of the University.
Sample
A total of 330 Israeli subjects were recruited voluntarily through
a polling service company and were paid in exchange for their
participation. One hundred and seventy three (52.4%) were
female, age range was between 25 to 60 years old, and the mean
age was M = 39 (SD = 10.14). Income level ranged between
much below average (n = 41; 12.4%), below average (n =
69; 20.9%), average (n = 128; 38.7%), above average (n = 66;
20%), and much above average (n = 21; 6.3%), with 5 missing
values. In terms of religiosity level, 171 (51.8%) were secular,
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76 (23%) traditionalists, 45 (13.6%) orthodox, and 38 (11.5%)
ultra-orthodox.
Procedure
The study consisted of three parts. In the first part participants
filled a consent form and then filled the chronic regulatory focus
measure. In the second part the subjects were divided randomly
into three treatment groups: Induced promotion focus (n = 94),
induced prevention focus (n = 116), and a control group (n
= 120). The manipulation included a word-completion task, in
which subjects were asked to complete missing words in a text,
using specific words that were provided in a list. The induced
promotion focus manipulation used a list of promotion words
(e.g., gain, aspirations, success), whereas the induced prevention
focus manipulation used a list of prevention words (e.g., loss,
obligations, failure). In the control condition no task was given.
In order to check the manipulation the participants were asked
to rate 8 behavior tendencies related to either a promotion focus
(e.g., eager) or a prevention focus (e.g., vigilant), on a 10-point
scale.
The third part of the experiment involved six scenarios.
Each scenario presents an uncertain situation with two possible
decisions: to retain the status quo (inaction) or to make a change
(action). One decision maker in the scenario chooses action
and the other chooses inaction, and both fail. The first two
scenarios replicated those used in previous studies (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1982; Zeelenberg et al., 2002), and the sixth scenario
is somewhat similar to that in Gilovich and Medvec (1995).
The additional new scenarios were developed to examine the
robustness of the results to different contexts and situations,
keeping the same structure of failed action vs. inaction. Three of
the scenarios (2, 5, 6) contained a trigger for change, either a prior
negative outcome or a change in the environment, while the other
three scenarios did not contain any signal for the need of change
(1, 3, 4). The scenarios were always presented in the same order,
from 1 to 6.
After each scenario the subjects were asked to indicate who
feels more regret (the one who acted or the one who did not act).
This was the question used in Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and
in Zeelenberg et al. (2002). Thus, in order to precisely replicate
the original studies, we did not add any other questions that
may affect the answers to the original question. In the four
additional scenarios, however, we added two questions that asked
the subjects to estimate the regret level of each decision maker on
a 0–100 scale. We assumed that when participants are asked to
estimate the regret level of a person in a hypothetical scenario
they will use their own experience and personality to make their
estimation. The six scenarios appear in the Appendix.
Measures
Individual Regulatory Focus was measured with two measures:
one is the scale of Lockwood et al. (2002), which is the most
common scale for measuring regulatory focus, and the other
is the Outcome-Based Measure (OBM; Schödl et al., 2013), a
recently developed scale for regulatory focus.
1. The Lockwood’s Regulatory Focus Scale consists of 18 items
with a 9-point Likert scale. An example of a prevention item
is “In general, I am focused on preventing negative events in
my life,” and an example of a promotion item is “In general,
I am focused on achieving positive outcomes in my life.”
To calculate the total regulatory focus measure, an average
score for each regulatory focus was calculated, then the gap
between the promotion focus score to the prevention focus
score was calculated (deducting the prevention score from
the promotion score). The higher the score, the higher is the
tendency toward promotion focus.
2. The OBM Scale of Regulatory Focus consists of 11-paired
items describing cognitive, emotional, and strategic outcomes
of regulatory focus based on Higgins (1997, 1998) theory.
Each pair has two endings, one of promotion and one of
prevention. A sample pair of items for a cognitive outcome
is: “In general, I pay attention to: (a) negative information,
(b) positive information.” A sample pair of items for an
emotional outcome is: “When I complete a task successfully:
(a) I feel relief, (b) I feel joy.” A sample pair of items for a
strategic outcome is: “In general, I am: (a) enthusiastic, (b)
cautious.” Both endings of each item are rated on a 0–10 scale
(0 = not at all true about me, 10 = very true about me).
Reliabilities were α = 0.83 for promotion and α = 0.82 for
prevention. A score for each regulatory focus was calculated
by the sum of the answers to the relevant endings (prevention
or promotion). The total regulatory focus measure is then
obtained by deducting the prevention focus score from the
promotion focus score. The higher the score, the higher is the
tendency toward promotion focus.
Demographic variables age, gender, income, and religiosity level,
were provided by the polling service company. Income was
measured on an ordinal five-point scale (much below average,
below average, average, above average, much above average).
Religiosity level contained four categories that represent four
main Israeli sectors: secular, traditionalist, orthodox, and ultra-
orthodox. We recoded religiosity into a dichotomous variable
with secular and traditionalist coded as “0” (non-orthodox), and
orthodox and ultra-orthodox coded as “1.”
RESULTS
Induced Regulatory Focus Manipulation
We first conducted a manipulation check for the regulatory
focus manipulation. A set of eight Independent-Sample t-
tests showed no differences between promotion and prevention
conditions in terms of the behavior tendencies evoked by the
word-completion task (t-tests ranged between −0.11 < t <
1.61; and significance levels.12 < p < 0.91). None of the eight
behavior tendencies revealed significant difference between the
two regulatory focus manipulations. As a result, the induced
regulatory focus was not used in further analyses, but in order
to control the potential effect of the manipulation, we added
to the regressions two dummy variables for the promotion
and prevention treatments (denoted by Promotion_Tr and
Prevention_Tr in the regressions), where the control treatment
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with no word-completion task is the benchmark. Thus, further
analyses tested hypotheses 1–3 only with regards to the individual
measures of regulatory focus and not regarding the induced
regulatory focus.
Who Feels More Regret?
Next, we considered the first question in each scenario, asking
which of the two decision makers feel more regret, the person
who acted or the person who did not act (the dichotomous
measure of regret). For each subject we only have a binary
response about who felt more regret, but aggregating over all
the subjects we can get the proportion of subjects that attributed
more regret to action or to inaction. Table 1 presents these
proportions and the test of whether the underlying probability
is different from 0.5 (using the binomial distribution).
The results show that in scenario 5 the proportions are exactly
50–50% and in scenario 2 more people attribute greater regret
to inaction (55.2 vs. 44.8%), but the difference is not statistically
significant. In the other four scenarios a higher regret was
attributed more often to the person who acted than to the person
who did not act, and the difference is statistically significant at
the 5%-level (using a 2-tailed binomial test). Table 1 also shows
that in three scenarios (2, 5, and 6) there were less than 57%
who attributed more regret to action (than inaction). In the other
three scenarios (1, 3, 4) more than 68% attributed more regret to
action. The difference between these two groups of scenarios will
be discussed later.
To test how regulatory focus is related to regret following
action vs. inaction, we conducted two sets of six logistic
regressions (one for each scenario) on the dichotomous measure
of regret, namely, which person regret more, the one who
acted (coded 1) or the one who did not act (coded 0).
The first set of regressions included the following predictors:
Demographics (age, gender, religiosity, and income), two dummy
variables of the manipulation treatment of regulatory focus,
and the individual regulatory focus measure of Lockwood. The
second set of regressions was similar but used the OBM scale
instead of Lockwood as the measure of individual regulatory
focus. The results of the 12 logistic regressions, summarized
in Table 2, show some support for Hypothesis 1. Specifically,
Table 2 demonstrates that in scenarios 2 and 5 (with both
measures of regulatory focus), and scenario 6 (only with the
OBM scale), individual regulatory focus had a significant effect
in the predicted direction, namely, the higher the promotion
focus the lesser the probability of attributing more regret
to the person who acted (compared with the one who did
not act).
To be able to analyze the six scenarios together and derive
more general conclusions, we created a database that aggregates
the scenarios but records the unique subject ID in each
observation. We then ran regressions on the combined data
of scenarios 1–6 (clustered by subject ID), which are reported
at the bottom of Table 2. These two regressions revealed that
individual regulatory focus was statistically significant in the
predicted direction (p= 0.017 using Lockwood’s scale, p= 0.001
using the OBM scale). That is, the higher the promotion level, the
less likely is the subject to attribute greater regret to the action
decision (vs. inaction).
To sum, the effect of regulatory focus on the likelihood of
attributing lower regret to the action decision (compared with
the inaction decision) was obtained in three out of six scenarios
when they are considered separately, and in the total measure
of regret across all six scenarios. In addition, except for scenario
6, these effects were consistent across two different measures of
regulatory focus. Thus, our results partially support hypothesis 1.
In addition to the effect of regulatory focus, subjects’ religiosity
level also had a significant effect on attributed regret. Specifically,
in scenarios 2 and 5 and in the aggregated scenarios 1–6 (see
Table 2) religiosity was positively and significantly related to the
probability of attributing more regret to the person who acted.
In scenarios 1 and 3 the effect of religiosity was positive and
marginally significant (p-levels ranged between 0.06 and 0.07).
All these mentioned effects of religiosity were consistently found
across the two sets of regressions with both scales of regulatory
focus. The positive effect of religiosity indicates that orthodox
people are more likely than non-orthodox people to attribute
more regret to action (compared to inaction).
Regret Levels Following Action vs. Inaction
In order to test Hypothesis 2 we conducted two sets of linear
regressions on the continuous measure of regret following action,
which was measured in scenarios 3–6. Two sets of four linear
regressions (for each of the four scenarios 3–6) were conducted
on the level of regret attributed to the person who acted in the
TABLE 1 | Who feels more regret–the person choosing action or inaction?
Scenario Regret following action is higher Regret following inaction is higher
N Frequency Percent (%) Frequency Percent (%) p-value (2-tailed)
1 330 246 74.5 84 25.5 0.000
2 330 148 44.8 182 55.2 0.069
3 307 211 68.7 96 31.3 0.000
4 297 212 71.3 85 28.7 0.000
5 314 157 50 157 50 1.000
6 299 169 56.5 130 43.5 0.028
The right column presents the 2-tailed p-value of the test (using the binomial distribution) of whether the probability of a subject attributing more regret to action (or inaction) is different
from 0.5.
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TABLE 2 | Logistic regressions: does action produce more regret than inaction?
Scenario Variables Lockwood’s scale OBM Scale
Coef. Std. Err. P Coef. Std. Err. P
1 Age −0.010 0.0131 0.405 −0.013 0.013 0.321
Female −0.003 0.263 0.990 −0.009 0.265 0.972
Religiosity 0.614 0.339 0.070 0.643 0.341 0.060
Income 0.050 0.119 0.673 0.068 0.119 0.568
Promotion_Tr −0.333 0.310 0.282 −0.340 0.310 0.273
Prevention_Tr 0.087 0.316 0.783 0.100 0.317 0.752
Lockwood’s promotion 0.075 0.072 0.301
OBM promotion −0.012 0.089 0.890
2 Age −0.029 0.012 0.018 −0.025 0.012 0.043
Female −0.021 0.232 0.928 −0.071 0.231 0.759
Religiosity 0.707 0.278 0.011 0.672 0.270 0.013
Income −0.086 0.110 0.430 −0.113 0.110 0.306
Promotion_Tr −0.355 0.294 0.228 −0.299 0.294 0.310
Prevention_Tr −0.054 0.267 0.839 0.002 0.269 0.992
Lockwood’s promotion −0.178 0.062 0.004
OBM promotion −0.191 0.080 0.016
3 Age 0.016 0.012 0.204 0.017 0.012 0.168
Female 0.197 0.253 0.435 0.152 0.257 0.554
Religiosity 0.564 0.308 0.067 0.581 0.312 0.062
Income −0.060 0.108 0.577 −0.062 0.105 0.553
Promotion_Tr 0.550 0.319 0.085 0.579 0.321 0.072
Prevention_Tr 0.331 0.293 0.259 0.383 0.295 0.194
Lockwood’s promotion −0.067 0.074 0.362
OBM promotion −0.134 0.086 0.122
4 Age 0.018 0.014 0.196 0.018 0.014 0.196
Female −0.212 0.266 0.427 −0.216 0.269 0.422
Religiosity 0.340 0.306 0.267 0.346 0.309 0.262
Income −0.042 0.117 0.720 −0.037 0.114 0.745
Promotion_Tr 0.128 0.332 0.698 0.129 0.330 0.697
Prevention_Tr −0.116 0.304 0.702 −0.111 0.305 0.715
Lockwood’s promotion 0.010 0.073 0.894
OBM promotion −0.007 0.081 0.927
5 Age −0.009 0.012 0.467 −0.004 0.012 0.714
Female 0.017 0.241 0.944 −0.029 0.243 0.903
Religiosity 0.787 0.290 0.007 0.747 0.286 0.009
Income −0.101 0.111 0.365 −0.132 0.106 0.213
Promotion_Tr −0.552 0.298 0.065 −0.499 0.296 0.092
Prevention_Tr −0.141 0.279 0.612 −0.095 0.277 0.731
Lockwood’s promotion −0.184 0.063 0.004
OBM promotion −0.174 0.080 0.030
6 Age −0.004 0.012 0.728 −0.003 0.012 0.796
Female 0.373 0.240 0.120 0.294 0.243 0.226
Religiosity 0.132 0.284 0.641 0.171 0.295 0.562
Income 0.188 0.099 0.058 0.203 0.101 0.044
Promotion_Tr −0.247 0.299 0.409 −0.198 0.302 0.511
Prevention_Tr −0.270 0.282 0.339 −0.166 0.289 0.566
Lockwood’s promotion −0.088 0.065 0.178
OBM promotion −0.252 0.084 0.003
(Continued)
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TABLE 2 | Continued
Scenario Variables Lockwood’s scale OBM Scale
Coef. Std. Err. P Coef. Std. Err. P
1–6 total Age −0.004 0.005 0.480 −0.002 0.005 0.668
Female 0.059 0.110 0.592 0.018 0.111 0.868
Religiosity 0.494 0.138 0.000 0.497 0.140 0.000
Income −0.013 0.0474 0.778 −0.019 0.048 0.682
Promotion_Tr −0.147 0.138 0.288 −0.118 0.138 0.391
Prevention_Tr −0.039 0.128 0.763 0.006 0.127 0.964
Lockwood’s promotion −0.074 0.031 0.017
OBM promotion −0.124 0.037 0.001
The dependent variable is ActMoreRegret, a dummy variable that equals one if the subject thinks that the person who acted feels more regret than the one who did not act. The table
reports the robust standard errors. The last regressions, on the combined data of scenarios 1–6, are clustered by subject ID.
Significant effects are bold.
scenario. The predictors in the logistic regressions were used also
here. In addition, the level of regret attributed to the person who
did not act (by the same subject in the same scenario) was also
included as an independent variable, in order to control for regret
following inaction when predicting regret following action.
Table 3 presents the regression results that show what affects
the regret attributed to the action decision. Because the question
about the level of regret after the action decision was introduced
only in scenarios 3–6, the results do not include scenarios 1–2.
In scenarios 4, 5 (with both measures of regulatory focus), and
6 (only with the OBM scale), individual regulatory focus was
significant at the 5% level in the predicted direction, namely, the
higher the promotion focus, the lower the regret level attributed
to the action decision. This effect was obtained beyond the
positive effect of the level of regret attributed to the inaction
decision. In other words, despite the fact that the level of regret
attributed to inaction was positively and significantly related to
the level of regret attributed to the action decision, the unique
effect of regulatory focus on regret attributed to action was
significant, supporting Hypothesis 2. To get an overview of the
general findings across all scenarios, we also ran two regressions
on the combined data of scenarios 3–6 (clustered by subject ID),
reported at the bottom of Table 3. In line with Hypothesis 2,
individual regulatory focus measured by both Lockwood’s scale
and the OBM scale was significant, such that the higher the
promotion focus, the lower the regret attributed to the action
decision.
To sum, the effect of regulatory focus on the attribution of
regret to an action decision was obtained in three out of four
scenarios and in the total measure of regret across all four
scenarios. In addition, these effects were consistent across two
different measures of regulatory focus. Thus, our results support
hypothesis 2.
In order to test Hypothesis 3, we ran two additional sets
of regressions on the level of regret following inaction. The
same predictors were used as in the previous regressions,
but this time we controlled for the regret level following
action, since we predicted the level of regret following inaction.
The results of these linear regressions are shown in Table 4
and surprisingly do not support Hypothesis 3. Specifically,
no effect of regulatory focus on the level of regret following
inaction was revealed (except for one effect of the Lockwood’s
scale in scenario 6). As can be seen in Table 4 the regret
level following action positively predicts the level of regret
following inaction, but regulatory focus has no unique effect
on regret following inaction. Thus, the results did not confirm
Hypothesis 3.
The Effect of a Trigger for Change
We now turn to examine Hypothesis 4, according to which a
trigger for change lowers the level of regret attributed to action.
Scenarios 2, 5, and 6, included a trigger for change, whereas
scenarios 1, 3, and 4 did not include any trigger for change.
Scenario 2, which replicates a study of Zeelenberg et al. (2002),
includes a negative prior outcome (losing the prior game), after
which the coach has to decide whether to change the team.
The prior loss creates a trigger to do something different, i.e.,
a trigger for change. Similarly, in Scenario 6, which deals with
a decision of students to change or not their university, it is
mentioned that the students are unhappy with their university,
again creating a trigger for change. In scenario 5, which deals
with two employees who have weekly manufacturing targets, it is
mentioned that this week the target was higher than usual. This is
not a prior negative outcome but it is an important change in the
environment, which can be a trigger for change in the decision
(which machine parameters to adopt). In contrast to those three
scenarios, scenarios 1, 3, and 4, describe a decision of two people
to change or not to change, without any additional information
that could be a trigger for change. For example, scenario 1 (a
replication of a scenario from Kahneman and Tversky, 1982)
describes two people who decide to change/not change a stock,
but no reason or additional information regarding the necessity
of a change is given. Similarly, scenarios 3 and 4 present two
decisions to change/not change a project (scenario 3), or a
supplier (scenario 4), but no additional information is given for
a prior negative outcome of the current project or supplier, or
a significant change in the environment. Therefore, no apparent
trigger for change is created in scenarios 1, 3, and 4.
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TABLE 3 | Linear regressions explaining regret following action.
Scenario Variables Lockwood’s scale OBM scale
Coef. Std. Err. P Coef. Std. Err. P
3 Regret for inaction 0.191 0.067 0.005 0.194 0.068 0.005
Age 0.016 0.153 0.918 0.046 0.154 0.763
Female 0.660 2.762 0.811 0.149 2.787 0.957
Religiosity 1.592 3.120 0.610 1.448 3.070 0.638
Income −1.049 1.285 0.415 −1.215 1.339 0.365
Promotion_Tr −0.204 3.129 0.948 0.278 3.119 0.929
Prevention_Tr 3.304 3.190 0.301 3.930 3.200 0.220
Lockwood’s promotion −1.375 0.764 0.073
OBM promotion −1.758 0.939 0.062
4 Regret for inaction 0.181 0.065 0.006 0.184 0.065 0.005
Age 0.039 0.159 0.803 0.077 0.161 0.631
Female 1.568 2.831 0.580 0.697 2.867 0.808
Religiosity 0.437 3.291 0.894 0.355 3.274 0.914
Income 0.946 1.309 0.470 0.785 1.401 0.576
Promotion_Tr −5.223 3.319 0.117 −4.501 3.281 0.171
Prevention_Tr −2.666 3.119 0.393 −1.620 3.111 0.603
Lockwood’s promotion −1.868 0.739 0.012
OBM promotion −2.894 0.875 0.001
5 Regret for inaction 0.141 0.069 0.041 0.148 0.068 0.031
Age 0.170 0.137 0.215 0.220 0.138 0.112
Female 1.027 2.819 0.716 0.119 2.863 0.967
Religiosity 3.900 3.518 0.268 3.730 3.467 0.283
Income −0.953 1.330 0.474 −1.209 1.370 0.378
Promotion_Tr −4.840 3.339 0.148 −4.026 3.287 0.222
Prevention_Tr −4.649 3.324 0.163 −3.589 3.356 0.286
Lockwood’s promotion −2.260 0.796 0.005
OBM promotion −3.062 0.988 0.002
6 Regret for inaction 0.227 0.072 0.002 0.235 0.070 0.001
Age 0.035 0.156 0.823 0.055 0.159 0.730
Female 2.393 3.034 0.431 1.69 3.073 0.582
Religiosity 2.227 3.563 0.532 2.370 3.491 0.498
Income 0.359 1.333 0.788 0.318 1.381 0.818
Promotion_Tr −2.040 3.788 0.590 −1.480 3.761 0.694
Prevention_Tr −3.369 3.517 0.339 −2.471 3.494 0.480
Lockwood’s promotion −1.133 0.836 0.176
OBM promotion −2.340 1.053 0.027
3–6 total Regret for inaction −.053 0.054 0.320 −.045 0.054 0.407
Age 0.050 0.130 0.703 0.090 0.131 0.492
Female 2.085 2.344 0.374 1.335 2.362 0.572
Religiosity 1.418 2.864 0.620 1.276 2.828 0.652
Income 0.183 1.345 0.892 −0.028 1.414 0.984
Promotion_Tr −3.499 2.588 0.176 −2.827 2.530 0.264
Prevention_Tr −1.944 2.735 0.477 −1.061 2.759 0.701
Lockwood’s promotion −1.845 0.652 0.005
OBM promotion −2.501 0.809 0.002
The dependent variable is the regret (on a 0–100 scale) following a failed action decision. The table reports the robust standard errors. The last regressions, on the combined data of
scenarios 3–6, are random-effects GLS regressions clustered by subject ID.
Significant effects are bold.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 October 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1684
Itzkin et al. Regulatory Focus and Regret Following Action/Inaction
TABLE 4 | Linear regressions explaining regret following inaction.
Scenario Variables Lockwood’s scale OBM scale
Coef. Std. Err. P Coef. Std. Err. P
3 Regret for action 0.209 0.070 0.003 0.21244 0.0711 0.003
Age −0.147 0.149 0.325 −0.1552 0.150 0.302
Female 2.368 2.821 0.402 2.692 2.830 0.342
Religiosity −3.087 3.154 0.328 −3.155 3.138 0.315
Income 1.665 1.247 0.183 1.670 1.231 0.176
Promotion_Tr −2.799 3.410 0.412 −3.037 3.409 0.374
Prevention_Tr −5.534 3.248 0.089 −5.956 3.212 0.065
Lockwood’s promotion 0.474 0.779 0.543
OBM promotion 1.073 1.035 0.301
4 Regret for action 0.210 0.075 0.005 0.216 0.076 0.005
Age 0.132 0.161 0.413 0.1372 0.161 0.394
Female 6.566 2.978 0.028 6.698 2.982 0.025
Religiosity 1.489 3.389 0.661 1.333 3.381 0.694
Income 0.259 1.299 0.842 0.177 1.297 0.891
Promotion_Tr 2.055 3.569 0.565 2.026 3.551 0.569
Prevention_Tr 2.105 3.429 0.540 1.916 3.443 0.578
Lockwood’s promotion −0.102 0.833 0.902
OBM Promotion 0.438 1.094 0.689
5 Regret for action 0.151 0.072 0.037 0.159 0.071 0.027
Age −0.138 0.158 0.381 −0.134 0.160 0.405
Female 3.417 2.918 0.242 3.616 2.943 0.220
Religiosity −5.634 3.507 0.109 −5.854 3.467 0.092
Income 1.845 1.308 0.159 1.755 1.309 0.181
Promotion_Tr −0.523 3.653 0.886 −0.575 3.636 0.875
Prevention_Tr 3.353 3.356 0.318 3.103 3.370 0.358
Lockwood’s promotion −0.098 0.824 0.905
OBM Promotion 0.627 1.005 0.533
6 Regret for action 0.216 0.068 0.002 0.230 0.068 0.001
Age −0.132 0.154 0.391 −0.081 0.156 0.605
Female −1.683 2.983 0.573 −1.561 3.037 0.608
Religiosity −4.416 3.586 0.219 −5.222 3.617 0.150
Income 1.985 1.298 0.127 1.497 1.303 0.251
Promotion_Tr −2.768 3.706 0.456 −2.527 3.779 0.504
Prevention_Tr 0.493 3.479 0.887 0.265 3.530 0.940
Lockwood’s promotion −1.724 0.781 0.028
OBM Promotion 0.171 0.936 0.855
3–6 total Regret for action −0.022 0.059 0.702 −0.014 0.059 0.805
Age −0.061 0.121 0.611 −0.040 0.121 0.744
Female 3.095 2.247 0.169 3.132 2.244 0.163
Religiosity −2.594 2.723 0.341 −2.937 2.706 0.278
Income 1.475 1.254 0.240 1.272 1.261 0.313
Promotion_Tr −1.733 2.606 0.506 −1.612 2.598 0.535
Prevention_Tr −0.288 2.562 0.910 −0.375 2.587 0.885
Lockwood’s promotion −0.751 0.601 0.212
OBM Promotion 0.035 0.792 0.964
The dependent variable is the regret (on a 0–100 scale) following a failed inaction decision. The table reports the robust standard errors. The last regressions, on the combined data of
scenarios 3–6, are random-effects GLS regressions clustered by subject ID.
Significant effects are bold.
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Table 1 already demonstrates that something is different
between the trigger for change (TFC) scenarios 2, 5, and 6, and
the no-TFC scenarios 1, 3, and 4. In particular, the proportion
of subjects who attribute greater regret to action than to inaction
ranged between 68.7 and 74.5% in the no-TFC scenarios, but only
44.8–56.5% in the TFC scenarios. Considering the continuous
variables of regret levels following action and inaction, we see
again a remarkable difference between the TFC scenarios (now
only scenarios 5 and 6 because no continuous regret levels were
elicited for scenarios 1 and 2) and the no-TFC scenarios 3 and
4. More specifically, in the no-TFC scenarios (3 and 4), the
regret from action was higher than regret from inaction and
the difference was statistically significant (68.31 vs. 56.29, p =
0.0000 in Scenario 3; 69.33 vs. 55.94, p = 0.0000 in Scenario
4). However, in the TFC scenarios (5 and 6) the regret levels
from action and inaction were very close and not statistically
significant (61.38 vs. 58.35, p = 0.1027 in Scenario 5; 59.27 vs.
57.79, p = 0.4274 in Scenario 6). Overall, the level of regret after
action was significantly higher when no trigger for change exists
compared to the TFC scenarios (68.82 vs. 60.33, p = 0.0000).
However, the regret from inaction was similar regardless of a
trigger for change (56.11 vs. 58.07, p= 0.1747).
Hypothesis 4 was tested on the combined data of scenarios
1–6 (clustered by subject ID). We ran logistic regressions on
the dichotomous measure of regret with the same independent
variables as in the previous logistic regressions, but also adding a
dummy variable for the trigger for change (coded “0” for no-TFC
scenarios, and “1” for TFC scenarios). In addition, in order to test
whether the effect of regulatory focus differs between TFC and
no-TFC scenarios, we added the interaction between the trigger
for change and the individual regulatory focus (TFCX promotion
focus). Table 5 summarizes the results of the two regressions
(one with Lockwood’s promotion focus and one with the OBM
promotion focus).
As can be seen in Table 5, according to our prediction,
the trigger for change had a significant negative effect on the
probability of attributing more regret to action, meaning that
when there is a trigger for change, less regret is attributed
to action (compared to no trigger for change). This finding
was consistent across the two measures of individual regulatory
focus and further confirmed Hypothesis 4. In addition, while
the main effect of regulatory focus was non-significant, the
interaction between regulatory focus and the trigger for change
was significant and negative. This significant interaction together
with the lack of significant effect of the promotion focus variable
itself, suggests that when asking subjects the binary question of
who feels more regret, there is no significant effect of promotion
focus in scenarios without a trigger for change, but there is a
significant effect of promotion focus once a trigger for change is
introduced. In particular, a trigger for change makes it less likely
that the greater regret will be attributed to the person who chose
action. These findings were consistent across the two measures of
individual regulatory focus.
In addition, subjects’ religiosity level also had a significant
effect on attributed regret, indicating that orthodox people are
more likely than non-orthodox people to attribute more regret
to action (p = 0.000 for both measures of regulatory focus). This
effect was consistent with the effects of religiosity that were found
in the previous logistic regressions (see Table 2).
We also tested Hypothesis 4 on the two continuous measures
of regret: regret following action (see Table 6) and regret
following inaction (see Table 7). Two sets of linear regression
models were conducted on the combined data of scenarios 3–
6 (clustered by subject ID). The independent variables were the
same as in the previous regression, except that we controlled for
regret following inaction when predicting regret following action;
and we controlled regret following action when predicting regret
following inaction.
As can be seen in Table 6, the trigger for change had a
significant negative effect on regret following action, meaning
that when there is a trigger for change, less regret is attributed to
action. This finding further confirms Hypothesis 4. In addition,
TABLE 5 | Logistic regressions explaining regret following action vs. inaction: adding the trigger for change.
Variables Lockwood’s scale OBM scale
Coef. Std. Err. P Coef. Std. Err. P
Age −0.004 0.006 0.489 −0.002 0.006 0.667
Female 0.062 0.116 0.592 0.020 0.117 0.864
Religiosity 0.519 0.145 0.000 0.521 0.147 0.000
Income −0.011 0.051 0.832 −0.017 0.051 0.734
Promotion_Tr −0.156 0.146 0.287 −0.125 0.145 0.390
Prevention_Tr −0.043 0.135 0.751 0.005 0.134 0.971
TFC −0.710 0.135 0.000 −0.867 0.105 0.000
Lockwood’s promotion −0.008 0.042 0.838
TFC X Lockwood’s promotion −0.125 0.051 0.014
OBM Promotion −0.052 0.048 0.277
TFC X OBM promotion −0.148 0.065 0.022
The dependent variable is ActMoreRegret, a dummy variable that equals one if the subject thinks that the person who acted feels more regret than the one who did not act. TFC, Trigger
for Change. The table reports the robust standard errors. The regressions are clustered by subject ID.
Significant effects are bold.
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TABLE 6 | Linear regressions explaining regret following action: adding the trigger for change.
Variables Lockwood’s scale OBM scale
Coef. Std. Err. P Coef. Std. Err. P
Regret for Inaction −0.055 0.053 0.302 −0.045 0.053 0.392
Age 0.050 0.131 0.704 0.090 0.131 0.493
Female 2.088 2.346 0.373 1.338 2.363 0.571
Religiosity 1.415 2.868 0.622 1.274 2.831 0.653
Income 0.184 1.347 0.891 −0.027 1.415 0.985
Promotion_Tr −3.501 2.591 0.177 −2.828 2.534 0.264
Prevention_Tr −1.944 2.739 0.478 −1.061 2.763 0.701
TFC −7.794 1.434 0.000 −8.263 1.254 0.000
Lockwood’s promotion −1.645 0.693 0.018
TFC X Lockwood’s promotion −0.401 0.636 0.529
OBM promotion −2.210 0.820 0.007
TFC X OBM promotion −0.581 0.751 0.440
The dependent variable is the regret (on a 0–100 scale) following a failed action decision. TFC, Trigger for Change. The table reports the robust standard errors. The regressions are
random-effects GLS regressions clustered by subject ID.
Significant effects are bold.
TABLE 7 | Linear regressions explaining regret following inaction: adding the trigger for change.
Lockwood’s scale OBM scale
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P Coef. Std. Err. P
Regret for action −0.013 0.060 0.822 −0.004 0.061 0.947
Age −0.062 0.120 0.607 −0.041 0.121 0.736
Female 3.077 2.237 0.169 3.119 2.231 0.162
Religiosity −2.608 2.710 0.336 −2.952 2.690 0.272
Income 1.474 1.245 0.237 1.273 1.249 0.308
Promotion_Tr −1.702 2.595 0.512 −1.582 2.585 0.540
Prevention_Tr −0.271 2.550 0.915 −0.364 2.572 0.887
TFC 3.557 1.736 0.040 2.085 1.440 0.148
Lockwood’s promotion −0.264 0.725 0.715
TFC X Lockwood’s promotion −0.941 0.758 0.214
OBM promotion 0.128 0.969 0.895
TFC X OBM promotion −0.131 0.879 0.881
The dependent variable is the regret (on a 0–100 scale) following a failed inaction decision. TFC, Trigger for Change. The table reports the robust standard errors. The regressions are
random-effects GLS regressions clustered by subject ID.
Significant effects are bold.
the effect of regulatory focus was significant such that the
higher the promotion focus, the lower the regret following
action (supporting Hypothesis 2 as in our earlier findings). The
interaction between trigger for change and regulatory focus was
non-significant. This pattern of results was consistent in both
measures of individual regulatory focus.
Finally, as can be seen in Table 7 and in line with Hypothesis
4, the trigger for change had a positive effect on regret following
inaction, meaning that when there is a signal that a change might
be needed, there is more regret following inaction. However,
this effect was weaker than the effect of TFC on regret from
action (the coefficients of TFC on regret from action are −7.8
and −8.3 in the two regressions, compared to coefficients of
+3.6 and +2.1 on regret from inaction). In addition, this effect
was statistically significant for the regret from inaction only
when the Lockwood’s scale was used. When using the OBM
scale this effect was not statistically significant, although it had
a positive coefficient as predicted. The individual regulatory
focus had no effect on regret following inaction, similar to
the results in Table 4, and once again not consistent with
Hypothesis 3. The interaction between individual regulatory
focus and the trigger for change also had no effect on regret from
inaction.
In sum, the data strongly support our prediction that the
existence of a trigger for change decreases the level of regret
following action, but only partially support our prediction that
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it increases the level of regret following inaction. In addition,
the effect of regulatory focus was similar to our earlier findings,
namely, promotion focus decreases regret following action
(supporting Hypothesis 2), but does not increase regret following
inaction (not supporting Hypothesis 3).
Summary of Results
Our results provide partial support for hypotheses 1, 2, and 4,
but did not support hypothesis 3. When testing whether more
regret is attributed to action decision or to inaction decision,
we found that regulatory focus was significantly related to regret
in three out of six scenarios (2, 5, and 6) and when the effect
is calculated across all six scenarios. The direction of the effect
indicates that the higher the promotion focus, the lower the
probability of attributing more regret to action. Similarly, when
testing the regret following action (where it was measured on a
0–100 scale, i.e., in scenarios 3–6), the same effect of regulatory
focus was found. Specifically, regulatory focus was related to
regret in three out of four scenarios (4, 5, and 6) and when the
effect is calculated across all four scenarios, such that the higher
the promotion focus, the lower the attributed regret following
action. However, when testing regret following inaction, there
was no effect of regulatory focus in any of the scenarios (except
for scenario 6 in Lockwood’s scale), and also not when calculating
the total effect across all four scenarios. In addition, according
to our prediction, we found that when the situation contains a
trigger for change, less regret is attributed to action and more
regret is attributed to inaction (although the effect of TFC on
inaction was not always statistically significant and it was weaker
than its effect on action). Finally, relatively high consistency was
found in the results pattern between the two scales of regulatory
focus. This consistency further strengthens the robustness of our
findings.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The present study examines the effect of regulatory focus on
regret feelings following action vs. inaction decisions. The results
indicate that individual differences in regulatory focus are related
to the level of regret that emerges after making a decision
that results in failure, and in particular, after making an action
decision. The mechanism that explains the effect of regulatory
focus on regret stems from the principle of regulatory fit.
According to this principle, when the individual regulatory focus
of decision makers fits their goal pursuit means or strategies, they
feel more right about what they are doing (Higgins, 2000, 2005,
2006). Because an action decision fits more promotion focus,
whereas an inaction decision fits more prevention focus (e.g.,
Chernev, 2004), we predicted that action will be less regrettable
for promotion-focused individuals, whereas inaction will be
less regrettable for prevention-focused individuals. Our results
indeed show that promotion-focused individuals attribute less
regret to action decisions than prevention-focused individuals.
However, no difference was found between individuals with
promotion and prevention foci with regard to regret from
inaction decisions.
Regulatory Focus and Regret
Our findings contribute to the regulatory focus research arena by
expanding the role of individual regulatory focus to the domain
of regret. So far numerous studies have found that regulatory
focus affects people’s decisions and choices (e.g., Aaker and Lee,
2001; Chernev, 2004; Lee and Aaker, 2004; Avnet and Higgins,
2006), strategies (e.g., Crowe and Higgins, 1997; Lockwood et al.,
2002) and emotions (e.g., Higgins et al., 1997). However, as far
as we know no study has investigated the effect of regulatory
focus on post-choice regret. While previous research showed that
people valued more decisions that were made under conditions
of regulatory fit, than under non-fit (e.g., Higgins et al., 2003), the
current research extends previous research by showing that under
regulatory fit condition, people are also less likely to regret their
decisions. Specifically, since action decision fits promotion focus
orientation, an action decision is regretted less by promotion-
focused individuals than by prevention-focused individuals.
Understanding the impact of regulatory focus on regret from
action vs. inaction could have implications for individuals’ well-
being and emotional regulation. For example, we can predict
that prevention-focused individuals will be more sensitive to
the negative effects of regret emerged by action decisions that
failed; such negative effects could be reduced well-being, guilt
or other negative feelings. On the other hand, our results do
not suggest that the opposite effect is true for promotion-
focused individuals, namely, inaction decisions that failed do
not seem to harm promotion-focused individuals (compared
to prevention ones). Thus, we suggest that prevention-focused
individuals will be more sensitive to the harmful effect of regret
following action decision, while promotion-focused individuals
will be more resilient to such harmful effect. This notion is
consistent with previous research suggesting that prevention-
focused individuals might be more vulnerable to reduced well-
being, whereas promotion focus is related to more resiliency
(Van Dijk et al., 2013). Future studies are encouraged to further
investigate the effect of regulatory focus on regret and regret
consequences, such as reduced well-being, negative feelings and
regret aversion.
Action and Inaction Asymmetry
Our findings show asymmetry in the effect of regulatory focus
on regret following action vs. inaction. This asymmetry has
not been revealed by previous studies. When using a binary
measure of regret (i.e., who regrets more: a person who acted
or a person who did not act), we found that promotion focus
decreased the probability of attributing more regret to action
than to inaction. However, using the binary question we still do
not know whether this effect results from promotion-focused
individuals attributing less regret to action, more regret to
inaction, or both. The use of additional two continuous measures
of regret (i.e., regret following action and regret following
inaction) revealed an asymmetric pattern between action and
inaction. Specifically, promotion-focused individuals attribute
less regret to action than prevention-focused individuals, but the
two groups attribute similar regret levels to inaction decisions.
This asymmetry between action and inaction implies that a
decision not to act is the default or the norm, as suggested by
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the norm theory (Kahneman and Miller, 1986). This means that
inaction or leaving things as they are, withoutmaking any change,
is the first and basic option in a situation of choice. Taking action
or changing the status quo, on the other hand, is a less trivial
choice and it requires more intent and deliberate plan. Therefore,
inaction decisions are similarly perceived by different individuals,
and even among individuals who tend to use action strategies
or a promotion focus–inaction is still an acceptable and normal
option. Action decisions, on the other hand, are perceived as
a desirable option only by individuals who are predisposed to
action; since an action decision is beyond the default and it takes
more effort and intent to choose it, such a decision will not
fit all individuals. This extends the norm theory of Kahneman
and Miller (1986), suggesting that individual differences (at least
with respect to the regulatory focus) are more notable in regret
following action than in regret following inaction. We encourage
future studies to further test the asymmetric effect of individual
regulatory focus as well as other individual tendencies on action
vs. inaction decisions.
Prior Negative Outcome and Trigger for
Change
Zeelenberg et al. (2002) suggested that when there is information
regarding a prior negative outcome, action decision becomes
more normal and acceptable, and therefore is less regrettable,
than when no such information exists. Our results support this
idea that a prior negative outcome makes action more normal
than otherwise and consequently reduces regret following action.
However, we go beyond this and find that not only prior negative
outcomes but also other situational cues that signal the need
for change, such as changing a weekly target at work (scenario
5), reduce regret following action. We suggest that a trigger for
change makes action more normal than without such a trigger,
and therefore it reduces regret following action, in line with the
norm theory of Kahneman and Miller (1986), which suggests
that regret is greater when it follows less normal decisions. Our
findings add to other studies that show particular situations in
which action is the norm and therefore produces less regret, such
as the decision of goalkeepers in penalty kicks to jump (Bar-Eli
et al., 2007). However, although our results show that a trigger
for change reduces the level of regret attributed to action, it is
not reversing the regret attribution pattern. In the three scenarios
that contained a trigger for change (2, 5 and 6), only in scenario
2 a reversed pattern was evident (i.e., inaction was perceived as
more regrettable than action). However, even in scenario 2, where
the percent of attributing more regret to action is only 44.8%
(the lowest among the scenarios), it is not statistically significant
different from 50%.
Practical Implications
An implementation of our results to decision making situations
in both individual and organizational contexts would be to select
promotion-focused individuals for decision making assignments
in which actions must be made. Since there is less regret
following action among promotion-focused individuals, it is
more likely that such individuals will have less regret aversion
and will be more willing to take action when it is needed.
Examples of contexts in which action decisions are mostly
preferred would be Hi-Tech industries, or organizations who
operate in a dynamic and turbulent environments that require
frequent changes in technology, products, human resources, and
so on. Another context that requires action decisions would be
an entrepreneurial environment, in which individuals must be
creative and innovative, discover opportunities, and develop new
products. We are not suggesting that only promotion-focused
individuals are required to make decisions in such environments
and contexts, but in comparison to stable environments, high
doses of promotion-focused individuals would be desirable. In
contrast, in stable and less dynamic environments, changes and
action decisions are required less frequently, and therefore the
advantage of promotion-focused individuals is less significant.
Yet, as our results show, inaction decisions are generally more
preferred and less regretted by all individuals, regardless of their
regulatory focus. Therefore, in steady environments, we suggest
that both prevention—and promotion-focused individuals will
tend to prefer inaction decisions. However, this idea needs further
examination in both lab and field studies.
Another practical implication for effective decision making
in organizations stems from our findings regarding the effect of
a “trigger for change.” In order to encourage action decisions
(in contexts that require changes), a useful suggestion would
be to provide such triggers for change. For example, a manager
who emphasizes to the employees the differences between the
current situation and the previous one creates more triggers for
change than a manager who emphasizes the similarities between
the situations or who does not emphasize anything. As another
example, consider two universities in which the Dean asks the
faculty to update their courses and propose beneficial changes to
the program. In the first university the Dean emphasizes that due
to increased competition from colleges there is a reduced demand
for the program. In the second university, although the situation
is similar, the Dean just asks to try to improve the program as
much as possible, ormay be even emphasizes the similarities (e.g.,
that after the proposed changes, courses should still be semester-
based, and the BA should still take 4 years). The first Dean, who
emphasizes the changes in the environment, creates a trigger for
change, and therefore is likely to encourage a more proactive
and innovative mindset, more changes, and more needed action
than the second Dean who did not create a trigger for change.
According to our findings, triggers for change reduce the level of
regret from action decisions, and thus increase the tendency to
adopt action decisions.
Research Limitations and Future Research
One limitation of our study is that the regulatory focus
manipulation did not produce the expected effect. The current
manipulation was chosen because we observed in other studies
that Israeli subjects do not react as expected to the more
commonmanipulations for regulatory focus (Higgins et al., 2001;
Freitas and Higgins, 2002), i.e., these manipulations did not
create promotion and prevention foci in Israeli samples. One
possible reason is different interpretation of Israelis (compared to
American subjects) of the terms used in Higgins’ manipulations,
namely oughts, duties, and obligations vs. ideals, dreams and
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aspirations. The manipulation that we have used is based on
similar technique used by Lockwood et al. (2002) and it was
recently tested by Schödl and Van Dijk (2014). Although the
manipulation was independent of the individual measure of
regulatory focus (because it was randomly allocated to subjects
and because it was carried out after measuring individual
regulatory focus), as another precaution we controlled for
the potential effect of the manipulation by adding it as an
independent variable in the regressions.
Another limitation of our study is that we tested the effect
of regulatory focus on regret with hypothetical scenarios rather
than creating true regret in the individual. However, creating real
regret in the individual is very difficult. One needs to have the
subject make a decision, then to make sure the decision results
in failure so that a potential regret may arise. Even then, if the
individuals do not attribute the failure to a significant mistake
they made, they might not feel regret. For example, if one guesses
the numbers in a lottery and then does not win, he probably
does not feel strong regret, because there was no way in which
he could know the winning numbers. So running an experiment
in which subjects make decisions and the experimenter informs
them that they made a mistake and they lose, will not necessarily
create regret. Furthermore, even if one can design an experiment
that creates real regret in the lab, it is likely to be regret about
losing small amounts of money in an artificial setting. On
the other hand, with the scenarios we were able to describe
situations that involve more significant regret than losing a
few dollars, and with a greater diversity of situations. By using
six different hypothetical scenarios in different contexts, three
different measures for regret, and two different measures for
individual regulatory focus, we further increase the robustness,
validity and the richness of the results. Although the above
arguments explain our choice of hypothetical scenarios, it is a
worthwhile direction for future research, albeit not an easy one, to
think about lab experiments with real consequences that induce
regret and use them to analyze how personality differences in
general and regulatory focus in particular affect regret. Such
studies may be interesting complements to our results.
Future studies should explore the impact of one’s religiosity
level on regret following action vs. inaction. Our findings show
that orthodox people tend to attribute more regret than non-
orthodox to a person who made an action decision. One
explanation could be that orthodox people are more conservative
and oriented to keep the status quo and avoid changes and risks.
However, this finding is found only when using the dichotomous
measure of regret and was not replicated with other measures of
regret. Therefore, more research is needed in order to verify this
effect.
Further research can be useful in order to verify our findings
about the influence of regulatory focus on regret and confirm
it in diverse situations, with different samples of subjects. We
suggest to further explore the asymmetric effect of regulatory
focus on action vs. inaction. An interesting direction would
be to examine whether inaction is a type of decision that is
perceived as the norm by most individuals, regardless of their
personality, whereas an action decision is perceived differently
according to the individual tendency, because it is considered
as a less normal strategy. Another direction could be to present
to the subjects various scenarios in different orders and analyze
whether the ordermakes a difference. Additionally, the trigger for
change should be tested in future studies in order to clarify and
identify what types of information are perceived as a trigger for
change, and consequently weaken the general tendency to regret
more action than inaction decisions. Finally, the interaction effect
that was found between the trigger for change and regulatory
focus calls for future research to explore whether (and in what
conditions) a trigger for change, which signals deviation from
the norm, increases the impact of individual differences on regret
feeling.
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APPENDIX: THE SCENARIOS USED IN THE
EXPERIMENT
Scenario 1: Stock Investment (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1982)
Paul owns shares in Company A. During the past year he
considered switching to stock in company B, but he decided
against it. He now finds out that he would have been better off
by $1200 if he had switched to the stock of Company B. George
owned shares in Company B. During the past year he switched to
stock in Company A. He now finds out that he would have been
better off by $1200 if he had kept his stock in Company B. Who
feels more regret?
Scenario 2: Soccer Teams (Zeelenberg
et al., 2002)
Jacob and Noah are both coaches of a soccer team. Jacob is the
coach of team A, and Noah is the coach of team B. Both coaches
lost the prior game with a score of 4–0. This Sunday Jacob decides
to do something: He fields three new players. Noah decides not to
change his team. This time both teams lose with 3–0. Who feels
more regret, coach Jacob or coach Noah?
Scenario 3: Project Management
Shirley and Rene are both project managers in a global company.
As part of their jobs they decide with which projects to continue
and which to terminate every quarter based on performance. At
the beginning of the year, both of them were required to make
a decision regarding projects that started earlier. Shirley decided
to terminate project A and switch it with project B. Rene on the
other hand decided to continue with project C that she started
earlier. At the end of the year it turned out that both projects B
and C failed, produced losses, and it was decided to terminate
them.
1. Who feels more regret, Shirley or Rene?
2. a. What is the level of regret that Shirley feels on a scale of
0–100 (0 - no regret at all, 100 - very high level of regret)?
b. What is the level of regret that Rene feels on a scale of
0–100 (0 - no regret at all, 100 - very high level of regret)?
Scenario 4: Supplier Choice
Emma and Mia both work as purchasing managers in a big
pharmaceutical company. As part of their jobs they decide with
which raw materials suppliers to work. The company has been
purchasing a variety of raw materials for the past five years from
supplier A. Emma needed rawmaterial X and received for it offers
from both supplier A and supplier B, who is a supplier that has
not yet been working with the company.Mia needed rawmaterial
Y and received for it offers from both supplier A and supplier C,
who is a supplier that has not yet been working with the company.
Emma decided to purchase the raw material X from the new
supplier B. Mia decided to purchase the raw material Y from the
old supplier A. After some time it was discovered that both new
raw materials X and Y, from both suppliers B and A respectively,
were of low quality and caused the company losses.
1. Who feels more regret, Emma or Mia?
2. a. What is the level of regret that Emma feels on a scale of
0–100 (0 - no regret at all, 100 - very high level of regret)?
b. What is the level of regret that Mia feels on a scale of 0–100
(0 - no regret at all, 100 - very high level of regret)?
Scenario 5: Machine Parameters
Michael and Daniel are both machine operators in a company
that manufactures plastic products. Every week each of them
receives his weekly target and has to make sure that the machine
under his responsibility will produce this target. This week the
target was higher than usual for both of them and therefore
Michael and Daniel pondered what to do. Michael decided to
change the machine parameters. Daniel decided to stay with the
regular parameters. At the end of the week both Michael and
Daniel did not succeed to reach the weekly target.
1. Who feels more regret, Michael or Daniel?
2. a. What is the level of regret that Michael feels on a scale of
0–100 (0 - no regret at all, 100 - very high level of regret)?
b. What is the level of regret that Daniel feels on a scale of
0–100 (0 - no regret at all, 100 - very high level of regret)?
Scenario 6: Academic Studies (Based in
Part on Gilovich and Medvec, 1995)
Roy and Alex both studied for a Bachelor’s degree inmanagement
and decided to continue to a Master’s degree in business
administration in the same university. After a short period in the
degree both Roy and Alex felt that the degree is not contributing
to them and the general feeling was that the attitude towards
them is unpleasant and they do not enjoy the degree. Roy and
Alex each considered whether to quit the university for a similar
track in another university. Roy decided to stay and Alex decided
to move to a different university. After half a year, they met
and updated each other. They found that both of them are still
unsatisfied with the degree they study.
1. Who feels more regret, Roy or Alex?
2. a. What is the level of regret that Roy feels on a scale of 0–100
(0 - no regret at all, 100 - very high level of regret)?
b. What is the level of regret that Alex feels on a scale of 0–100
(0 - no regret at all, 100 - very high level of regret)?
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